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Re: Security Advisory - Recent compromise of freefall.freebsd.org
From: Warner Losh <imp(at)village.org>
Date: Mon Feb 17 1997 - 22:17:25 EST
In message <199702171308.AAA26318@mirriwinni.cse.rmit.edu.au> Phillip
Musumeci writes:
I have seen tools that will do runtime closures on the data. Could this overflow, given where the data has been. Generally, one had to turn off these tests because they were too verbose for normal code. Which is to say generally normal code has lots of problems... I've not seen any of these compiler extensions recently. I wonder what happened to them. Guardian I think was the name of the product. A cooler idea than purify, but not as effective of telling you when you corrupt the heap, stack or other parts of memory. What is needed is some static flow analysis tool to point us at the hotspots that might overflow, and would ignore those cases that can't overflow (eg char buf[1024]; int i = rand(); sprintf( buf, "%d", i);)[*] However, that will do nothing for the race conditions, the bad uses of mktemp, et al, the sloppy use of seteuid(), badly written setuid progarms, etc. Warner [*] Before you object to newer, larger word machines, please consider that it would take ints with 1024 * ln(10)/ln(2) bits (about 3402) before you could even have a single character overflow. Received on Mon Feb 17 19:17:42 1997 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 12:41:02 EDT |
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