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debsums: no md5sums for a lot of important packages on sarge
From: Alexandros Papadopoulos <apapadop(at)alumni.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon Oct 08 2007 - 03:30:50 EDT
During investigation of kernel panics on a Debian stable (sarge) server I administer I installed debsums. The result of the first run was: blah:~# debsums -c debsums: no md5sums for at debsums: no md5sums for base-files debsums: no md5sums for binutils debsums: no md5sums for bsdutils debsums: no md5sums for bzip2 debsums: no md5sums for console-data debsums: no md5sums for debian-archive-keyring debsums: no md5sums for ed debsums: no md5sums for gnupg debsums: no md5sums for gpgv debsums: no md5sums for hotplug debsums: no md5sums for initscripts debsums: no md5sums for kernel-image-2.6.8-2-686 debsums: no md5sums for klogd debsums: no md5sums for libbz2-1.0 debsums: no md5sums for libdb4.2 debsums: no md5sums for libdb4.3 debsums: no md5sums for libdb4.4 debsums: no md5sums for libgdbm3 debsums: no md5sums for liblockfile1 debsums: no md5sums for libncurses5 debsums: no md5sums for libncursesw5 debsums: no md5sums for libreadline4 debsums: no md5sums for make debsums: no md5sums for mawk debsums: no md5sums for mime-support debsums: no md5sums for module-init-tools debsums: no md5sums for modutils debsums: no md5sums for mount debsums: no md5sums for ncurses-base debsums: no md5sums for ncurses-bin debsums: no md5sums for netbase debsums: no md5sums for openbsd-inetd debsums: no md5sums for php4 debsums: no md5sums for php4-pear debsums: no md5sums for rsync debsums: no md5sums for squid debsums: no md5sums for squid-common debsums: no md5sums for ssh debsums: no md5sums for sysklogd debsums: no md5sums for sysv-rc debsums: no md5sums for sysvinit debsums: no md5sums for sysvinit-utils debsums: no md5sums for update-inetd debsums: no md5sums for util-linux blah:~# Now, I consider this is a pretty secure machine, I monitor it closely with tripwire, it has a very tight network fingerprint, multiple layers of authentication, latest security patches are always installed on the day they are published etc. So I believe the above output NOT to be the result of a breach. My question is, is it acceptable to have so many important and widely used packages in *stable* without MD5 checksums? Secondly, how can one fix this on a production system? Is the following method proposed by Paul Gear @ http://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2005/06/msg00126.html the best/only way?
cd /var/cache/apt/archives
Thanks for any input -A -- This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Mar 19 2008 - 06:54:09 EDT |
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