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full drive encryption - check /boot for manipulation
From: Michael Heide <michael.heide(at)student.uni-siegen.de>
Date: Thu Oct 18 2007 - 15:51:45 EDT
I was concerned about the fact, that there is one simple way to circumvent the hole encryption system if someone has physical access to the pc: to simply replace the kernel or initrd at the boot partition to include some trojan horses, or something else... I do not know of anything in a standard debian installation, which monitors this, so I've writen some little scripts for this purpose :-) It's more or less an idea / proof of concept for now, there are no checks in it. For example if /boot has to be mounted before updating etc... nor it's immune against manipulation for its own, e.g. the modified initrd can simply update the bootmd5 database by its own ;-) ... It simply checks the md5sum of all files in /boot and if there are new or vanished files. It has to be run after every kernel update, needless to say. No, I know I'm not a security expert. So please tell me, If I'm completely wrong :-). For any answer to this list, please CC me, I'm not a list member (for now).
Sincerely
-- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster@lists.debian.orgReceived on Thu Oct 18 16:10:10 2007 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Mar 19 2008 - 06:54:13 EDT |
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