linux-ipsec: Re: ipnsec & IPsec survey
Dear Ghislaine,
thank you for your interest in ipnsec. I work as a chairman and CEO of a
consultancy company with over 50 staff. We work mainly for the central and
local government, but we have also large contracts in the industry
(utilities, manufacturing). We specialize on network design and
outsourcing and security.
We had a requirement from the government sector for implementing an IPSec
based solution with the deadline of March 31st 1998. After surveying the
exiting implementations available at that time, the state of standards and
drafts and our position regarding the US export restrictions, we have
decided to contribute to a faster development of what was available for
Linux at that time (linux IPSec version 0.7). We took the IPSec
implementation available for Open BSD as our second source of ideas and
tools and have put together something what we have hoped will be used to
the benefit of other developers of the Linux based solution. We have tried
to follow the Open Source model and have released all interim versions
which were stable enough to enable testing of interoperability with other
IPSec solutions. We have demonstrated 100% compatibility with Open BSD,
although our source code was different from that of Open BSD.
At the same time, a group of developers mainly from Canada have created
another branch in successors to IPSec for Linux and have created what is
now known as KLIPS (part of the FreeS/WAN project). We have hoped for
merging our and their code, but that has never happened. As the government
project was cancelled and there was no interest at all in ipnsec (alhough
quite a few people have downloaded the code, we did not get any positive
or negative feedback except about 2 messages just after the release), we
have ceased any further development of ipnsec and we encourage everybody
to have a look at the FreeS/WAN project instead. This does not mean that
we are not prepared to support anybody who has decided to use ipnsec in
favour of other options.
As you can see, IPSec implementations and standards are a moving target
and the scene today is completely different from that in late Winter this
year. We were in a similar position as you are today and we have tried to
boost the development by contributing our work and trying to recycle code
from other available sources to create a best of breed solution. Our
attempt was not widely accepted, but others were more successful and their
solution is much better today.
I think that someone might be interested in our implementation simply for
historical reasons. I would suggest you list it on your Web page with this
comment and possibly a contact to myself for any questions.
I have received another IPSec implementation for Linux called lipsec from
someone in Chile. It is available on the same FTP site as ipnsec for
reference. This FTP site is ftp://ftp.eunet.cz/icz
Sincerely,
--
Petr Novak
Chairman & CEO
ICZ a.s.
Zirovnicka 6
CZ-106 00 Praha 10
Ph: +420 2 2424 5124
Fax: +420 2 2424 5125
On Mon, 16 Nov 1998, Ghislaine Labouret wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I am a security consultant in HSC, a French company which is specialized in
> TCP/IP and Unix security.
>
> We are very interested in IPsec and are currently working on a survey on
> IPsec/IKE implementations, which I plan to turn into a web page listing the main
> implementations.
>
> Is your implementation, ipnsec, still evolving, or have you completely stopped
> working on it ?
>
> Could you possibly fill this survey ?
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
> Regards,
>
> --
> Ghislaine Labouret
> Network security consultant
> Hervé Schauer Consultants (HSC)
>
>
>
> +------------------------------------------------+
> | Checklist for implemented IPsec / IKE features |
> +------------------------------------------------+
>
> How to fill this form:
> [ ] not supported
> [.] partially implemented or planned (please specify)
> [X] supported
> [?] don't know
>
> Feel free to add any '[ ] Other' line and/or comments if needed.
>
> -------------------
> General information
> -------------------
>
> Compagny / organism / project / person:
>
> Product name and version:
> (Please fill a different checklist for each product)
>
> Product type (check all that apply):
> [ ] Router
> [ ] Firewall
> [ ] IPSEC Gateway
> [ ] IPSEC Host
> [ ] Client Software
> [ ] Other:
>
> Platform(s):
>
> IP versions:
> [ ] IPv4
> [ ] IPv6
>
> Where is the product developped ? Can it freely be exported from that country ?
>
> Can the product product be used in France (i.e. is it authorized by the SCSSI) ?
> Under certain conditions ?
>
>
> --------------
> IPsec features
> --------------
>
> Protocols:
> [ ] AH transport mode
> [ ] AH tunnel mode
> [ ] ESP transport mode
> [ ] ESP tunnel mode
> [ ] IP compression
>
> SA combinaisons:
> [ ] Transport adjacency
> [ ] Iterated tunneling
> [ ] Nested tunneling
>
> AH authentication transforms:
> [ ] HMAC-MD5 (MUST)
> [ ] KPDK-MD5
> [ ] HMAC-SHA-1 (MUST)
> [ ] DES-MAC
> [ ] HMAC-RIPE-MD
>
> ESP cipher algorithms:
> [ ] ESP_NULL (MUST)
> [ ] DES-CBC (MUST)
> [ ] DES_IV32
> [ ] DES_IV64
> [ ] 3DES (SHOULD)
> [ ] RC5
> Key length(s):
> [ ] CAST
> Key length(s):
> [ ] IDEA
> [ ] 3IDEA
> [ ] BLOWFISH
> Key length(s):
> [ ] RC4
> Key length(s):
>
> ESP authentication transforms:
> [ ] HMAC-MD5 (MUST)
> [ ] KPDK-MD5
> [ ] HMAC-SHA-1 (MUST)
> [ ] DES-MAC
> [ ] HMAC-RIPE-MD
>
> IPCOMP Transforms:
> [ ] OUI
> [ ] DEFLATE
> [ ] LZS
> [ ] V42BIS
>
> Key and SA management:
> [ ] Manual
> [ ] Photuris
> [ ] IKE (please answer the IKE part of the survey below)
> [ ] Other (please give the caracteristics of your key management system)
>
> -----------
> SPD and SAD
> -----------
>
> Selectors:
> (How to answer : S=source only, D=destination only, X=both)
> [ ] IPv4 Adress
> [ ] single
> [ ] subnet (network adress / netmask)
> [ ] range (first adress - last adress)
> [ ] wildcard
> [ ] IPv6 Adress
> [ ] single
> [ ] subnet (network adress / netmask)
> [ ] range (first adress - last adress)
> [ ] wildcard
> [ ] Transport Layer Protocol
> [ ] Port number
> [ ] Name
> [ ] Fully-qualified domain name (foo.bar.com)
> [ ] Fully-qualified username (piper@foo.bar.com)
> [ ] ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name [X.501]
> [ ] ASN.1 X.500 General Name [X.509]
> [ ] Text string (vendor specific info for pre-sahred
>
> keys)
> [ ] Data sensitivity level (IPSO/CIPSO labels)
> [ ] Other:
>
> >>> End of the survey if you are only doing manual SA management <<<
>
> -----------------------------
> IKE (with IPsec DOI) features
> -----------------------------
>
> Possible DOIs during phase 1:
> [ ] Generic ISAKMP
> [ ] IPSEC
>
> Negotiation Modes:
> [ ] Main Mode (MUST)
> [ ] Aggressive Mode (SHOULD)
> [ ] Base Quick Mode (MUST)
> [ ] Quick Mode with optional KE payload for PFS (MUST)
> [ ] New Groups Mode (SHOULD)
>
> Phase 1 authentication methods:
> [ ] Pre-shared key (MUST)
> [ ] DSS Signature (SHOULD)
> [ ] RSA Signature (SHOULD)
> [ ] Encryption with RSA (SHOULD)
> [ ] Revised Encryption with RSA
> [ ] DH-less RSA Encryption
> [ ] GSS-API
>
> ISAKMP SA encryption algorithms:
> [ ] DES-CBC (MUST)
> [ ] 3DES-CBC (SHOULD)
> [ ] CAST-CBC
> Key lenght(s):
> [ ] RC5-R16-B64-CBC
> Key lenght(s):
> [ ] IDEA-CBC
> [ ] BLOWFISH-CBC
> Key lenght(s):
>
> ISAKMP SA hash algorithms:
> [ ] MD5 (MUST)
> [ ] SHA (MUST)
> [ ] Tiger (SHOULD)
>
> ISAKMP SA Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)
> [ ] Default (HMAC version of hash algorithm)
> [ ] Other:
>
> SA Life Type and Duration:
> [ ] For ISAKMP SA (MUST)
> [ ] Seconds
> [ ] Kilobytes
> [ ] For IPsec SA (MUST)
> [ ] Seconds
> [ ] Kilobytes
>
> DH groups:
> [ ] Definition by group descrition:
> [ ] Default 768-bit MODP Group (Oakley group number 1) (MUST)
> [ ] Alternate 1024-bit MODP Group (Oakley group number 2) (SHOULD)
> [ ] EC2N Group on GP[2^155] (Oakley group number 3) (SHOULD)
> [ ] EC2N Group on GP[2^185] (Oakley group number 4) (SHOULD)
> [ ] Other:
> [ ] Definition by group attributes:
> [ ] Group Type:
> [ ] MODP
> [ ] ECP
> [ ] EC2N
> [ ] Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial
> [ ] Group Generator one and two
> [ ] Group Curve A and B
> [ ] Field Size
> [ ] Group Order
>
> Supported ISAKMP versions:
> [ ] 0.1 (anterior to draft v10)
> [ ] 1.0 (draft v10)
>
> ISAKMP Payloads:
> [ ] Security Association (SA), Proposal (P) and Transform (T) Payloads
> [ ] Key Exchange Payload (KE)
> [ ] Nonce Payload (NONCE)
> [ ] Hash Payload (HASH)
> [ ] Signature Payload (SIG)
> [ ] Identification Payload (ID)
> [ ] Certificate Payload (CERT)
> [ ] Certificate Request Payload (CR)
> [ ] Notification Payload (N)
> [ ] Delete Payload (D)
> [ ] Vendor ID Payload (VID)
> [ ] Attribute Payload (ATTR)
>
> Additional ISAKMP Exchange Types:
> [ ] Informational (MUST)
> [ ] Transaction
>
> Identification (ID payload):
> >for generic phase 1 exchange only
> [ ] IPV4_ADDR
> [ ] IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET
> [ ] IPV6_ADDR
> [ ] IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET
> >for phase 1 or 2 with IPsec DOI
> [ ] Upper layer protocol
> [ ] Port number
> [ ] IPV4_ADDR
> [ ] FQDN (fully-qualified domain name "foo.bar.com")
> [ ] USER_FQDN (fully-qualified username "piper@foo.bar.com")
> [ ] IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET (network adress / netmask)
> [ ] IPV6_ADDR
> [ ] IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET
> [ ] IPV4_ADDR_RANGE (first adress - last adress)
> [ ] IPV6_ADDR_RANGE
> [ ] DER_ASN1_DN (ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name
>
> [X.501])
> [ ] DER_ASN1_GN (ASN.1 X.500 General Name [X.509])
> [ ] KEY_ID (vendor specific info for pre-sahred keys)
>
> Certificate Types (CERT and CR payloads):
> [ ] PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate
> [ ] X.509 Certificate - Signature
> [ ] X.509 Certificate - Key Exchange
> [ ] X.509 Certificate - Attribute
> [ ] Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
> [ ] Authority Revocation List (ARL)
> [ ] SPKI Certificate
> [ ] PGP Certificate
> [ ] DNS Signed Key
> [ ] Kerberos Tokens
>
> Notify message types (N payload):
> [ ] Base ISAKMP error messages
> [ ] Base ISAKMP status messages
> [ ] Additional IPsec DOI status messages
>
> IPsec DOI situations:
> [ ] Identity_Only (MUST)
> [ ] Secrecy
> [ ] Integrity
>
Received on Tue Nov 17 08:36:07 1998
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