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Re: [Hipsec-rg] Some comments on draft-ahrenholz-hiprg-dht-01
From: Ahrenholz, Jeffrey M <jeffrey.m.ahrenholz(at)boeing.com>
Date: Mon Aug 06 2007 - 11:28:10 EDT
> This is supported also in the DNS extensions, so why not in It seems like you are thinking of the DHT as a DNS replacement. Without looking back at the DNS draft (RFC), I'm not sure what you would do with all of those locators returned from a query. For the DHT, I was thinking more of bootstrapping, where you have the HIT (or domain name) and you only need to find most current, usable address. Constraint was not the intent, but rather simplicity. > Anyway, I don't think the issue is not just local. All of the ring OK, what if the DHT server is not HIP-capable? What if it's not running a native HIP/btns API? How would you enforce a uniform policy? We don't require DNS servers to run HIP. They just need to be able to carry a HIP RR. In the DHT draft, I am suggesting running one hash + signature verification if you want some security. These are basic crypto functions that should be available to a system, a system that isn't necessarily running HIP or has access to special APIs. This approach takes advantage of the security properties of HIP naming. Also the DHT draft separates the two secure and insecure uses. When you put/get using "hip-secure-addr" you know that every server in the ring is performing the HI -> HIT validation, and put/get using "hip-addr" offers no guarantees. The "hip-addr" is immediately useful because we can use the (unmodified) OpenDHT nodes on PlanetLab. > Seems like there are two options: As noted above, option (2) requires a HIP-enabled server, which I feel may be unnecessary. > I'd go a little bit further in the HIP/DHT integration. The With "hip-secure-addr" this protection already exists because the put is not accepted unless signed by the node that possesses the HI private key. > * When the putting node is behind NAT, the DHT could include If you know you're behind a NAT, why not store the RVS address? We would need to adopt a format for indicating RVS (as you mentioned) such as the DNS RR format. > I guess the current DHT draft does even not distinguish RVS It seems like the DHT draft should just reference the HIP DNS RR format. -Jeff Hipsec-rg mailing list Hipsec-rg@listserv.cybertrust.com https://listserv.cybertrust.com/mailman/listinfo/hipsec-rg Received on Mon Aug 6 11:28:56 2007 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Mon Oct 29 2007 - 14:16:02 EDT |
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