Re: [Hipsec-rg] next steps with draft-heer-hip-middle-auth-00
Hi Julien,
Thanks for your comments, find my comments in-line.
Am 23.01.2008 um 11:43 schrieb Julien Laganier:
> Hello Miika, > > On Tuesday 22 January 2008, Miika Komu wrote: >> On Mon, 21 Jan 2008, Henderson, Thomas R wrote: >>> Questions or comments raised during the RG presentation: >>> - Philip Matthews raised some questions about the relevance of the >>> use case described (access point sharing, and the assumptions on >>> the location of the attackers) and whether HIP was the right >>> solution for this (versus, for example, WPA). He also suggested to >>> look at other work in IETF on how to talk to middleboxes >> >> WPA is used wireless networks and it does not solve the problem for >> wired networks. > > WPA is a specification of the Wi-Fi Alliance that implements (most) > IEEE
> 802.11i specification. > > IEEE 802.11i specifies security for 802.11 wireless media, and > relies on > IEEE 802.1x which is a network access control/authentication > mechanisms > for 802 style media. > > Thus, IEEE 802.1x is not limited to wireless or wired, and can > perfectly > be used with IEEE 802.3 media, a.k.a. Ethernet. > >> I am not an wireless expert, but I believe you need >> something like RADIUS to create individual WPA keys for each host, >> right? Otherwise hosts can snoop each others traffic and do the >> attack described in the draft. > > IEEE 802.1x does not require a AAA infrastructure per se, it is an > underlying layer for EAP. However, for scalability reasons you might > want to centralize credentials in a AAA server so that credentials > need > not be distributed to all access points. > >> Also, WPA is usually used at the edge and it does not solve the >> problem when the multiple middleboxes on the path. > > W.r.t. edge vs. multiple midboxes on-path, if network access > control/authentication is the goal, it is sufficient to perform it > once, at the edge. >
Thank you for the clarifications on WI-Fi protection.
However, I would like to move away from this Wi-Fi protection
discussion because it is not part of the draft.
The usecase of Wi-Fi sharing was only used to highlight one possible
application of HIP. This application
demands that a middlebox can verify the identities of communicating
hosts by observing the HIP handshake.
This scenario is not limited to Wi-Fi sharing but is also relevant
for other usecases.
The scope of the draft is to illustrate a possible replay attack
towards the middlebox and proposes a solution that enables the
middlebox to interact with the BEX.
> I think the draft should more accurately state what is the goal, > security-wise. E.g. authentication alone is vague and prone to > ambiguous interpretation. Once that is done, relevance of the solution > can be assessed.
Do you think the title is misleading or do you believe we should be
more specific in the abstract and text?
Thanks for your comments,
Tobias
> >> I don't think that we should force dependencies to some other >> protocols in a *HIP* middlebox... does not make much sense to me. >> >> As a conclusion, I think the middlebox draft from Tobias makes a lot >> of sense for replay protection for middleboxes. > > I think we should first determine what's the goal pursued. Then we can > decide if the specific solution makes sense. >
> My 2 cents. > > --julien > >
--
Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Distributed Systems Group
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
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Received on Wed Jan 23 08:07:29 2008
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