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RE: "run as" local denial-of-service enables administrative account processes to be killed
From: James C. Slora Jr. <james.slora(at)phra.com>
Date: Tue Jun 26 2007 - 10:30:18 EDT
> Summary: While a user, at any security membership level, is logged It's true Microsoft does not display a unified front on such security issues, and they sometimes have conflicting advice on their site. But Runas is more useful for escalating privilege than for downgrading it. Anything running on your interactive desktop can interact with anything else running on it, regardless of the security context that started each app. So privilege-lowering conveniences like Runas or even desktop VMs are absolutely subject to the possibility of cross-context interaction. There are security context checks built into many functions, and you did find one that does not have things as locked down as they should be, but these locks and checks are vector-specific and do not address the basic exploit potential directly. I don't see a lot of exploits of this potential, but it is designed into Windows and needs to be there for you to be able to interact with the apps yourself. So running an interactive sandbox on a trusted system will inherently increase your risks. See KB327618 for more info.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue Jun 26 2007 - 12:40:02 EDT |
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