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TippingPoint IPS Signature Evasion
From: Paul Craig <paul.craig(at)security-assessment.com>
Date: Tue Jul 10 2007 - 17:37:03 EDT
During security analysis of the Tippingpoint IPS product a signature evasion vulnerability was discovered. The use of specific Unicode characters on particular web servers allows a remote user to bypass IPS detection.
By using a hex encoded alternate Unicode character for forward slash (/) a request can be produced that will not match any IPS signature present in the TippingPoint device.
Example:
The same URI with alternate Unicode forward slash characters are not detected by the signature. http://www.test.com/scripts%c0%afcmd.exehttp://www.test.com/scripts%e0%80%afcmd.exehttp://www.test.com/scripts%c1%9ccmd.exe Web servers located behind a Tippingpoint IPS device which are capable of decoding alternate Unicode characters can be accessed, and exploited without triggering the IPS device.
Security-Assessment.com has been in contact with Tipping and a new version
of the Tippingpoint IPS software has been released to address the
discovered vulnerability.
Discovered and advised to Tippingpoint January 18th 2006 by Paul Craig of Security-Assessment.com
About Security-Assessment.com
Security-Assessment.com is committed to security research and development, and its team continues to identify and responsibly publish vulnerabilities in public and private software vendor's products. Members of the Security-Assessment.com R&D team are globally recognised through their release of whitepapers and presentations related to new security research. Security-Assessment.com is an Endorsed Commonwealth Government of Australia supplier and sits on the Australian Government Attorney-General's Department Critical Infrastructure Project panel. We are certified by both Visa and MasterCard under their Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Programs.
Paul Craig
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Mon Jul 16 2007 - 05:18:42 EDT |
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