|
|||||||||||
|
RE: More on VMWare poor guest isolation design
From: Tim Newsham <newsham(at)lava.net>
Date: Mon Aug 27 2007 - 19:36:54 EDT
> should be able to protect a virtual guest from its host. There's no way a UAC is not a security boundary. You don't need administrator privileges. If the VM is running with the same privileges of the attacker, he can alter the program state of the VM. The most obvious way with VMWare is to pause the machine. This writes out physical memory as a .vmem file. Alter the file and resume VMWare. Less obviously you can use the OS debugging APIs, or inject a DLL into the address space of the VM process, or map its memory using memory management APIs, or exploit a vulnerability in the VM process, or..... Similar attacks can be performed by altering the disks or attaching malicious hardware. You could point out that the guest OS need not trust the disk or the hardware and you would be right. However, all of the important OSs *DO* trust disks and most are very trusting of hardware. Your statements that administrator access protects the VM is simply false. Your assumption that UAC will protect you from low-privileged worms is similarly wrong. > Mark
Tim Newsham
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Oct 28 2007 - 06:13:58 EDT |
||||||||||
|
|||||||||||