Re: [Full-disclosure] 0day: PDF pwns Windows

Crispin Cowan wrote:

>
> This is a perfectly viable way to produce what amounts to Internet
> munitions. The recent incident of Estonia Under *Russian Cyber Attack*?
> <http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3678606> is an example
> of such a network brush war in which possession of such an arsenal would
> be very useful.
>
> Crispin

One would presume that governments across the world would have their shares of unpublished exploits but with all the incidences of government networks being compromised, I don't believe this to be the case. What happened in Estonia though was nothing more than a botnet attack on their infrastructure
(http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199602023) not an 0day attack.

0day's defined as "unpublished exploit" wouldn't do much in a cyberwarfare theater as country against country as the purpose of such warfare would LIKELY be to disconnect/disrupt communications. In the cases of industrial/country vs. country espionage it might (likely) will  be more effective for the long haul but in the short term, 0days will be useless in this type of "cyberfight". Think about it logically, you want to "disrupt" country X's communications, not tap them. You'd want to make sure their physical army had no mechanism to communicate. You'd want to make sure financially you would cripple them. Not worry about injecting some crapware onto a machine for the sake of seeing what their doing.

Reconnaissance is usually something done beforehand to mitigate your strategy. Not mitigate what's happening after you possibly sent 1Gb of traffic down a 100Mb pipe.

-- 
====================================================
J. Oquendo
"Excusatio non petita, accusatio manifesta"
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xF684C42E
sil . infiltrated @ net 
http://www.infiltrated.net


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