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AW: [IDS] IDS Common Criteria
From: <detmar.liesen(at)lds.nrw.de>
Date: Wed Jan 08 2003 - 03:11:42 EST
BTW: I have once tried to read the orange book but I gave up on the 12th page or
so.
However, for stuff like b2b, even private companies nowadays tend to prefer E3/high certified products. As most of you probably know, in the US and in Germany (I don't know about the others) it's compulsory to protect your business - and thus your it-infrastructure as well - from known threats that could bankrupt you (for those who want to know, I am talking about the German KonTrag act and it's consequences).
If you have a security concept and your infrastructure is certified E3/high, you
have solid proof that you have taken adequate measures for protecting your
business and this protects you (as a business owner or executive) from being
charged for serious negligence if this is the right term in english.
:)
For government security-infrastructure such as firewalls, E3/high is compulsory anyway.
Just my 2 Cents
Cheers,
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Randy Taylor [mailto:gnu@charm.net] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 8. Januar 2003 00:50 An: Talisker; focus-ids@securityfocus.com; ids@mailman.vet.com.au Betreff: Re: [IDS] IDS Common Criteria
At 11:00 PM 1/7/2003 +0000, Talisker wrote:
You've hit the hidden nail pretty close to its head. The U.S Government
public sector now requires significant Certification and Accreditation (C&A)
efforts for any new infrastructure being stood up and it is in the process
of introducing C&A into existing infrastructure. CC product certifications
are an integral part of the C&A process now, and they're not going away.
The U.S. Military has been doing C&A on their critical infrastructure for
as long
From the outside-in view, CC and it's C&A parent are bureaucratic at best and Byzantine at worst. In the projects I'm involved with these days, I spend as much time on C&A issues as I do on technical issues. I'm seeing the process from the inside. It does get mind-bogglingly complex sometimes, and everyone I know that's involved relieves the pressure with an occasional witty rant or two. My previous humorous comments aside though, C&A has identified weakness in infrastructure that would have escaped detection otherwise. C&A has this annoying habit of working. Sure, the overall process can be improved, and I'm sure it will - but it does what it's supposed to do now. From a structural security perspective, C&A is essential. I wouldn't be surprised to see the commercial sector adopt C&A processes and demand CC certs in the next year or two. 8) Randy Received on Wed Jan 8 20:12:43 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:01:05 EDT |
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