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Re: VDS FAQ - request for feedback
From: David W. Goodrum <dgoodrum(at)nfr.com>
Date: Wed Jan 29 2003 - 17:52:21 EST It's interesting that you talk about commercial vendors eventually doing this type of detection. NFR already focuses a lot of it's current signatures on what you are terming as "VDS". For example, our SSH package watches for vulnerable versions of SSH. We have a number of other packages that perform similar activity. By watching for vulnerabilities (vs exploits), we detected the MS SQL slammer worm over the weekend, without updating any signatures. I've included a sample SSH vulnerability alert below:
Alert Message: ssh server on 10.0.1.7 vulnerable to
OpenSSH integer overflow
Source IP: 10.0.1.205
Destination IP: 10.0.1.7
Reason: ssh server OpenSSH_3.1p1 vulnerable to
OpenSSH integer overflow
TECHNICAL INFORMATION
OpenSSH servers with versions 2.3.1 through 3.3 (inclusive) are also vulnerable to the same bug in the PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt code. Privilege separation, which was introduced in OpenSSH 3.2, allows authentication code to be executed as an unprivileged user. Prior to this feature, authentication was executed as root. Privilege separation is enabled by default in OpenSSH 3.3 and prior releases. The severity of this vulnerability is largely based on which user executes authentication. REFERENCES
David J. Meltzer wrote:
--David W. Goodrum Senior Systems Engineer NFR Security Mobile: 703.731.3765 Office: 240.747.3425 Received on Fri Jan 31 11:21:49 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:01:08 EDT |
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