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RE: Active response... some thoughts.
From: Ralph Los <RLos(at)enteredge.com>
Date: Fri Feb 07 2003 - 00:51:35 EST
I'm going to go out on a limb here...I'm trying to aggregate answers. Here's what sounds logical to me:
Does this sum it up pretty well? If not, some correct me? /Ralph/
-----Original Message-----
Chris, Not just poorly implemented IDS but spoofed packets as well. How does an active IDS differentiate and if it can't is it possible to do the old CHARGEN - ECHO trick using the IDS of different companies to start sending RST packets at ever increasing rates against each other? If the IDS would even respond to RST floods (would be stupid I suppose).... I have tested networks with Active IDS and the only problem I found was when the IDS actually blocked my I at the router. The tester then has to ensure that the IDS has been told who to cut off and who not to and for how long. Otherwise, it's too easy to spoof packets and DoS for legitimate traffic and providers. The question then becomes is the service more or less valuable than the security of that service? Active IDS just does not work with Usability in my opinion. Too many things can and do go wrong which will make legitimate users and the service offered to them to be inconvenienced.
Sincerely,
-----Original Message-----
Thomas; I was also thinking about a liability from a poorly implimented system being able to be used to DOS an address by spoofing packets from that address. I guess I come back to advocating passive solutions primarily.
Best Wishes,
Thomas H. Ptacek wrote: >On 1/31/03 1:22 PM, "Chris Travers" <chris@travelamericas.com> wrote:
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