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RE: TDS level attack- IDS and Industrial intelligence
From: Drew Copley <dcopley(at)eeye.com>
Date: Wed Jul 09 2003 - 16:05:37 EDT
'Detecting a variety of buffer overflow attacks' is quite different from being able to detect every possible variation of existing SQL attacks. (And, indeed, the phrase "parses TDS" is a very ambiguous term -- unless you mean that you can truly parse all incoming SQL attacks as the SQL engine itself would parse them). On a typical SQL overflow (outside of such SQL bugs as the Sapphire worm which used a static portion of the protocol) you may have an overly long buffer presented: [Ax1000] Might be presented legitimately as: 'AAAAA...' + 'AAAA...' + ... Or as @mybin1 + @mybin2 Etc, etc.... Logical operators might be used or not... And, further, there are numerous commands which might be used for such overflows such as "replicate()". (And note, many SQL issues use the replicate command in their demonstration, but this command could be removed, of course). Lastly, you have much otherwise legitimate traffic which might be quite illegitimate. For instance, your everyday [and many] SQL injection attacks. Static protocols posed some difficulties. There are a variety of ways to encode or segment such traffic. But with full blown languages such as javascript or SQL going over the net -- this is a different can of worms. Ed Cole has some very good comments here. He is absolutely right. > -----Original Message-----
The Lightning Console aggregates IDS events, correlates them with vulnerability info, reduces false positives with the click of a button, and distributes this information to hundreds of users. Visit Tenable Network Security at http://www.tenablesecurity.com to learn more. Received on Fri Jul 11 13:02:36 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:01:16 EDT |
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