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RE: IDS is dead, etc
From: Tom Arseneault <TArseneault(at)counterpane.com>
Date: Thu Aug 07 2003 - 15:00:31 EDT Here is my overall IDS opinion (mentioned just so I can get feed back as to how close/far from the mark I am) an external (outside the firewall) NIDS system that just logs, only used to give general attack trends but does not give alerts, and internal NIDS systems at strategic locations to closely monitor the important systems which do give alerts. Of course generous amounts of HIDS and other technology sprinkled along the way to round out the package. Sorry about leaving out the "In a perfect world with unlimited resources" part, it may have made my original post more in line with others thinking.
Thomas J. Arseneault
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On Wed, 6 Aug 2003, Tom Arseneault wrote: I don't think inflation has driven up the price of my opinions so far yet 8^) > Any particular Nimda attack if your patched does'nt mean anything, however
I'm not sure how relevant this really is. If you are patched against the vulnerability then you are patched, it doesn't matter if a new variant is released that exploits the same vulnerability. A new worm exploiting a new vulnerability is a different story but hopefully you'd have a seperate or a more generic sig to detect this. I don't know how often it would be that a new worm exploiting a new vulnerability would match the signature in your IDS sensor for an old vuln such as is exploited by CR/Nimda. In fact, just limiting ourselves to CR/Nimda, it shouldn't be too difficult to limit the match to just internal->internal traffic which is the most effective way to detect an old, unpatched and infected host on your network. The attack vector and propegation methods of CR/Nimda are widly known, and completely uninteresting if you are not vulnerable. I think what we have here though are different perspectives borne of different needs and different sensor layouts. I would imagine that even if there were sensors on every subnet of UT Dallas that wouldn't be enough coverage to really determine the attack trends for the Internet at large. That's probably different from your setup, as an MSSP you have access to sensors all over the place, so would have more data to go on when determining wider trends.
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Captus Networks - Integrated Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping
Captus Networks - Integrated Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping
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