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RE: Exchange in the DMZ
From: Welsh, Armand <Armand.Welsh(at)SSCIMS.com>
Date: Tue Nov 26 2002 - 12:47:07 EST
If the front end server is for SMTP and HTTP access, then you are better off using an SMTP daemon (like sendmail) and an http proxy server (like squid, although squid has it's own security risks) on the DMZ so that they front end the web mail and smtp interface into exchange. Then exchange resides only on the inside network. This allows you to setup firweall rules so that only smtp and http(s) are allowed from the dmz gateways to the exchange front end server. Internet users can only access boxes on the DMZ, and only DMZ systems can access specific internal systems.
If you want to use outlook/exchange MAPI access from the internet, then
you are best off utilizing a vpn for this type of access, since mapi
access requires each and every internet exchange server have internet
exposure for mapi functions. With SSH and other products, it's a
trivial matter to setup an SSL wrapper on the DMZ that has the needed
The proxy and the gateway will give you the buffer you are wanting, plus there is an added advantage, you can use these gateway systems as honey pots too. So this way you can get an early warning if any unauthorized activity occurs on these systems. Although it's not generally recommended to turn production systems into honeypots, in this scenario, it's not really such a bad idea since these systems could even be configured (via firewalling) to allow unidirectional access to a honeynet. All around, using non microsoft gateways for your inbound exchange traffic is a good idea..
Regards,
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:01:25 EDT |
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