I'm referring to infosec forensics not legal forensics.
Believing what you see on a computer screen makes invalid assumptions any
time an attacker can anticipate what it is that you expect to see. Using
MD5/SHA-1/etc. for hashing leaves you vulnerable to this type of social
engineering where your expectations are satisfied therefore you think you're
secure -- but anyone, anywhere could have come up with the key (the right
hash) that will satisfy your expectations -- so what good were those
expectations in the first place?
Jason Coombs
jasonc@science.org
-----Original Message-----
From: Ed Carp [mailto:erc@pobox.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 10:16 AM
To: Jason Coombs
Cc: admin@forensicfocus.com;
securityfocus.com!forensics@adsl-61-76-31.pns.bellsouth.net
Subject: RE: CRC32 vd MD5
On Sun, 19 Jan 2003, Jason Coombs wrote:
> I gain some security through obscurity if I supplement standard hash
I disagree. If you can't prove that your algorithms don't actually
increase the chances of a collision, they're worthless, and they wouldn't
stand up for more than 30 seconds in a court of law. By using your own
algorithms, you're just handing the case to a smart defense attorney - on
a very silver platter.
--
Ed Carp, N7EKG
http://www.pobox.com/~erc 214/986-5870
Licensed Texas Peace Officer
Computer Crime Investigation Consultant
Director, Software Development
Escapade Server-Side Scripting Engine Development Team
http://www.squishedmosquito.com
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Received on Fri Jan 24 16:15:24 2003
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