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Re: A question for the list...
From: Ray Stirbei <me(at)highentropy.org>
Date: Wed May 21 2003 - 02:04:04 EDT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Dave, I commend your passion to write such a lengthy post and there is no disagreement about the negative impact of worms and DoS atacks. I also agree with you that such a strike back would probably be effective in mitigating these types of attacks. For the sake of reference here are the sources of this discussion. Most of these have reader feedback: Tim's original posts and presentation from last summer: http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/98http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/134http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-asia-02/bh-asia-02-mullen.pdf
An academic paper presented to IEEE about the same time as Tim's work - summer
2002 ( Nimda season ).
Here's the argument in 2001
And 2000
You can find references in the IEEE paper when this topic was discussed in 1999, 1998, etc. The IEEE paper deals with the majors issues in a systematic way. In the context of your message, a big problem we face is not knowing the identity of the attacker. A few years ago IDS vendors introduced the capability to dynamically update firewall ACLS to drop all traffic from hosts who 'seemed' to attack the network. This concept is called shunning and its a sensible idea. The problems started when attackers would launch an common attack (whom the IDS sensor is sure to pick up), but masqueraded the traffic to make it look like it is from the IDS sensor itself. Surely enough, the IDS responds by adding firewall rules which in effect shut down the IDS sensor. The irony is almost Shakespearean. A lot of things that makes sense (in the area of self-defense) in the physical world, don't hold water on the Intenet. Cars, for example, are powerful tools but can also wreak great havoc in irresponsible hands. So we have tight federal regulations mandating safety featuresand construction, traffic laws at all gov't levels and licensing for all operators. We don't have this on the Internet! Moreover, even if US passes laws legalizing a counterstrike, there are many other countries in the world (190 to be exact) an attacker can choose to attack from. Even script kiddies these days bounce around the world prior to an attack. Security is a difficult endeavour and I suspect the long term approach to this problem are better secured systems that (passively) react and neutralize the threat. Your message brings many great points. In reponse to the Fizzer approach, I restate that counter attacking is effective. However, this is a complex topic with all types of consequences and just becuase its effective doesn't mean it is the right thing to do. ray
On Sunday 18 May 2003 02:56 pm, Dave Sharp wrote:
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To get your FREE white paper visit us at: http://www.securityfocus.com/AirDefense-incidents Received on Wed May 21 12:39:34 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:02:05 EDT |
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