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Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures
From: Þórhallur Hálfdánarson <tolli(at)tol.li>
Date: Tue Jun 24 2003 - 20:39:58 EDT Maybe I'm pointing out something said many times before, but I guess that comes with newcomers. :)
-*- Henry O. Farad <lrcrypto@red4est.com> [ 2003-06-24 23:36 ]:
Some point on situations where you have little as no information up front on the target. The client will probably want to know how easily identifiable his honeypots are, before access has been gained on the honypot. If a decoy is a part of the security measures, it should be working. Then again, the client might have gotten the idea to disguise a productional system as a honeypot to distract intruders... so I guess you'll have to perform the pentest anyway. ;) Although, as most intruders would, save it 'til the end. For different client requests (like Acl Proxy mentioned), this obviously does not apply. On a side note, Michael Boman brought up an interesting point: "There is a viable scenario for this. Let's say ACME Inc. wants to do their own pen-tests because they [...] want to steal their tools and techniques". A questioncrossed my mind yesterday that's related to this -- "Do pentesters have clauses in their contracts regarding the client re-using the methods used by pentesters" -- that is for knowledge gained by the client from information not-in-the-report, but through devices tested. -- Tolli tolli@tol.li --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Latest attack techniques. You're a pen tester, but is google.com still your R&D team? Now you can get trustworthy commercial-grade exploits and the latest techniques from a world-class research group. Visit us at: www.coresecurity.com/promos/sf_ept1 or call 617-399-6980 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------Received on Tue Jun 24 22:31:07 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:02:38 EDT |
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