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Re: PGP scripting...
From: Andre Mariën <andre.marien(at)ubizen.com>
Date: Fri Jan 24 2003 - 04:54:40 EST
Thanks for going back to the rot.
problem statement:
first proposal: use symmetric encryption
problem: encrypting key is present somehow
on the system, so in theory local users
improvement: use assymmetric encryption
Question: two stage or single stage?
Question: is one stage assymetric OK?
My answer: be careful, it may not be OK. Attack: repeat the encryption for possible plain texts. If that space is smaller than the key space, you have a better attack. example - unclear: db with credit card numbers Find 'a' credit card number: requires enumeration over number of creditcards. Which search space is larger? example - clear: did you buy at company xxx? Search space is the amount of entries: small. example (logs) : did the IDS pick up my attack? I known fairly accurately what the data would be, so I just look in the database (or traffic) to find this evidence.
I hope this makes it clear.
Jason Coombs wrote: > Andre Mariën wrote: > >>We are talking about confidentiality I thought.
>
>
> I thought we were talking about the value of asymmetric encryption in a
> scenario where a sending box (the encryptor) needs to effectively get rid of
> the data ASAP but do so in a way that is recoverable on another box (the
> decryptor) which is purposefully not accessible from the encryptor via the
> network.
>
> Asymmetric encryption is also valuable for bulk encryption in a scenario
> where a software vendor or other already-public entity needs to communicate
> authentic data ("here is the latest build of our software") but doesn't want
> to deal with the problems of PKI (certificates, certificate chains, digital
> signatures, etc.) and wants some digital communications authentication but
> doesn't want to try to publish a list of authentic hashes (which, absent a
> digital signature and PKI, a third-party can simply tamper with upstream
> from an end-user) or distribute executable bytes that most people will
> simply execute without further verification anyway -- by encrypting the
> software build with the vendor's private key, any third party who wishes to
> execute the software must first obtain the vendor's public key and decrypt
> the software. Either the software decrypts with the vendor's public key
> (giving a sort of lightweight digital signature) or it doesn't and if it
> doesn't then there is no way to execute the bytes and the whole computer
> world is a lot safer as a result.
>
> This thread was started on 1/7/2003 when Andrew MacKenzie wrote:
>
>
>>We (my client) have a system that loads orders into an Oracle DB, and > > the > >>like) shall be PGP encrypted, and *never* be stored on a HDD in > > >>I can understand the desire to archive these files in encrypted forms, and > > >>My question therefore is: is all this worth the trouble? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andre Mariën [mailto:andre.marien@ubizen.com] > Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 9:05 PM > To: jasonc@science.org > Cc: Glynn Clements; Beatie, Breck (ISSMountain View); > secprog@securityfocus.com > Subject: Re: PGP scripting... > > > It may be just me, but I am getting confused. > If we keep both private and public key secret, > why not use plain old symmetric cryptography? > We are talking about confidentiality I thought. > If we take it to non-repudiation there still are some merrits. > > One of the things about public/private keys is, > well, the public key can be public. > > -- André > > > Jason Coombs wrote: > >>Interesting discussion -- just a point of clarity: > > key. > >>Without the public key, you're still stuck brute-forcing the key length > > on > >>scanning a single byte until it comes up "n" or "f" and then attempt to > > plaintext > >>in the event that the secret session key is captured along with the > > than > >>it is to capture [the symmetric secret key AND the IV and the > > ciphertext] -- > >>for the simple reason that at the point of encryption the softwre that > > private > >>key necessary for decryption. > > > -- > André Mariën > > Ubizen http://www.ubizen.com > Phone +32 16 28 70 00 > Fax +32 16 28 71 00 > -- André Mariën Ubizen http://www.ubizen.com Phone +32 16 28 70 00 Fax +32 16 28 71 00Received on Fri Jan 24 14:16:48 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:02:45 EDT |
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