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Re: Apache 2.x leaked descriptors
From: David M. Wilson <dw-securityfocus.com(at)botanicus.net>
Date: Sun Feb 23 2003 - 19:46:56 EST On Sat, Feb 22, 2003 at 02:46:59PM -0800, jon schatz wrote: > you can do more than that. unless the web server uses suexec, all the
> at least w to all log files for all vhosts (probably r+w)
Installations like this are few and far between, it is the equivilant of chmod 777 /etc/passwd. Apache opens log files while still root, so write permission granted to the lower-permission Apache user should rarely happen in a properly administered environment. > at least r on all webhosting directories
In a properly administered environment (where directory indexes are not enabled) you will at best have execute premissions, leaving you the option of brute-forcing the names of files in webroots. This is true since if indexing is disabled (mod_autoindex is disabled or not compiled in, and no DirectoryIndex entry which points to an indexing script is specified), Apache never attempts to read a directory, it only needs to stat() and open() inside it to serve GET/HEAD/POST requests. > at least r+x on all cgi-bin directories
Execute permission on a directory does not mean that its content is executable, but that a process may chdir() into that directory and access files by name inside that directory. Read permission on a directory means a process may list its contents via readdir(), or getdents(), etc. David. Received on Mon Feb 24 16:23:46 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:07:38 EDT |
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