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Re: New Web Vulnerability - Cross-Site Tracing (fwd)
From: Jeremiah Grossman <jeremiah(at)whitehatsec.com>
Date: Wed Jan 22 2003 - 19:09:41 EST On Wed, 2003-01-22 at 15:25, Marc Slemko wrote: > The only new thing here is that this provides a way to get HTTP
Ok... the example you specify definitely achieves the same end this new attack does. But it does so without using any of the bugs you assume in your examples. Comparing apples to oranges really. Also, I dont recall ever seeing a browser bug where you could compromise the HTTP Basic Auth creds without have access to a target server. Maybe if we stretch it to URL trickery ok. But this was not done using purely JavaScript as the paper clearly states. > The reality is that there are many cases where the server returns
> Embedding session IDs in returned links is one (very commonly
I definitely see your point and its valid. There are indeed many ways to get the web application to echo credentials which are not stored security. Such as URL, etc. What we are attempting to relate is that for your type of attack to work, you NEED a web application that is in some way flawed. What we propose is that you no long NEED a web application to be flawed, simply a supporting TRACE web server and the creds are yours. > The bottom line: Why do you even need to steal the user's
> And having access to those two things is exactly what
We are not assuming or requiring the browser to be flawed any more than that. Again, I see your point... if you can grab a file off their machine... what would be the point of all this. To state once more... this is not required. I also apologize if you took the media coverage to be a bit much. We dont control the media however, surely Marc from experience you know that. Received on Wed Jan 22 20:33:57 2003 This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Aug 23 2006 - 14:07:47 EDT |
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